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I. Introduction
Nietzsche occasionally uses terms such as Großmuth  (GS, 49)  that get rendered in 
English as “magnanimity.” When he does, he is picking out something like its current mean-
ing, namely that of being generous and forgiving. This sort of magnanimity in the narrow 
sense is something Nietzsche regards as a virtue. That may come as a surprise to those who 
operate with the caricature that he has no admiration for such things, preferring crude ego-
ism and vengeance. While this passing praise of “magnanimity” in the narrow sense is im-
portant to recognize, it is a fairly minor note in Nietzsche’s work. In bringing Nietzsche into 
dialogue with the tradition of thinking about the virtue of magnanimity, we do better if we 
harken back to  the  Aristotelian  “crowning”  virtue  of  megalopsychia  (often translated as 
“magnanimity”) and consider what the corresponding Nietzschean notion might be. 
Nietzsche, like Aristotle, is centrally concerned with the idea of greatness of soul in his 
moral psychology and ethics.  Given its present Christian connotations,  that word “soul” 
might seem odd in Nietzsche’s mouth. Yet when it comes to notions of the soul, Nietzsche 
is concerned that we not throw out the baby with the metaphysical bathwater. He is, to be 
sure, skeptical of what he sees as the “calamitous atomism” about the “soul” propagated by 
Christianity and some of its forbearers (e.g., Plato in the Phaedo)—-the conception of “the 
soul as something indestructible, eternal, indivisible, as a monad, as an atomon: this belief,” 
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Nietzsche says, “ought to be expelled from science!” (BGE, 12). But he goes on to add right 
after: “Between ourselves, it is not at all necessary to get rid of ‘the soul’ at the same time, 
and thus to renounce one of the most ancient and venerable hypotheses…[t]he way is open 
for new versions and refinements of the soul-hypothesis; and such conceptions as ‘mortal 
soul,’ and ‘soul as subjective multiplicity,’ and ‘soul as social structure of the drives and af-
fects,’ want henceforth to have citizens’ rights in science (BGE, 12). 
In what follows, I will be exploring this notion of greatness of soul in Nietzsche and 
how it relates to Nietzschean greatness in general. For few philosophers is human greatness 
as paramount as it is for Nietzsche (UM, III:6). Greatness, for him, seems to take prece-
dence over ordinary moral goodness. He is disdainful of the herdish values of compassion 
and humility, and in their place, he especially celebrates values that are associated with and 
realized by certain exceptional great individuals. Nietzsche, importantly, does not see great 
individuals just as means to other things that are of value–symphonies, philosophical works, 
and the like. Rather, he sees them as instantiating certain values themselves, in the sort of 
excellent characteristics they have and in the sort of impressive lives they lead. They are, for 
him, ends-in-themselves.  But what marks oﬀ these great individuals? Given Nietzsche’s un1 -
systematic style of presentation, we do not get a strictly delineated account. We instead get 
examples of great individuals,  and various scattered comments about some characteristic 
features of human greatness. In this paper, I will seek to give an indication of Nietzsche’s 
views on these issues, with a particular emphasis on thinking about greatness of soul, that is, 
the broadly-speaking psychical characteristics that are both conducive to and constitutive of 
 This is not to say that all that is of value for Nietzsche are great individuals and their individual achievements. 1
Nietzsche, as I argue elsewhere, also takes whole cultures to be valuable for their own sake. See Andrew Hud-
dleston, Nietzsche on the Decadence and Flourishing of Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). 
Huddleston    of  3 32
exceptional flourishing as Nietzsche conceives it. In sketching the features that are salient 
for Nietzsche, I hope, in conjunction with the other papers in the volume, to indicate Niet-
zsche’s commonalities and divergences with a broader strand of thinking, stemming from 
receptions of Aristotle’s megalopsychia. 
The paper will proceed as follows: After mentioning a few of Nietzsche’s salient ex-
amples of great individuals, I will work through, and comment on, what he notes as some of 
the central marks of greatness.  I then turn to a few reflections on Nietzsche’s relation to 2
Aristotle. In some work on Nietzsche, as well as in recent literature on the virtues, there has 
been dissatisfaction with Walter  Kaufmann’s  influential  suggestion that  the Nietzschean 
great person is similar to the Aristotelian megalopsychos. While we should recognize that 
there are key diﬀerences between Nietzsche and Aristotle—and Kaufmann never claimed 
the parallel was exact—we should not exaggerate these diﬀerences either, particularly not on 
the assumption that Nietzsche is a kind of crude irrationalist. Kaufmann’s suggestion, I will 
argue, remains an enlightening way of situating Nietzsche’s thought on this topic. But that 
said, there is another major point of divergence between Nietzsche on the one hand and 
Aristotle and other figures on the other.  In the core of the tradition of thinking about 
greatness of soul, it will be thought to go hand-in-hand with moral goodness. Nietzsche, by 
contrast, seems to regard there as being an important tension between morality and the sort 
of human greatness he celebrates. I discuss, in conclusion, a few ways of understanding this 
 I focus primarily on material from the latter part of Nietzsche’s career. There was undoubtedly some degree 2
of development of Nietzsche’s ideas on this topic from The Birth of Tragedy and the Untimely Meditations of the 
1870s to the final works of 1888, such as Ecce Homo. One salient diﬀerence is in the figures he admires: Wagner 
and Schopenhauer are much lauded in Nietzsche’s early works, but drop out of favor in his later works. Was 
this the result of Nietzsche’s standards of greatness and ideas about it themselves changing, or simply his in-
terpretation and assessment of these people? I suspect it is mostly the latter, though considerations of space 
preclude me from exploring in detail the way in which his views may have evolved. This would require, in par-
ticular, a more detailed analysis and treatment of the Untimely Meditations,  and comparison of it with later 
works, than I am able to oﬀer in this paper. 
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tension and its implications for Nietzsche’s relation to the main strand of thinking about 
this topic.
II. Exemplars and Preliminaries
It will be useful to begin by mentioning a few of the figures that Nietzsche singles 
out for praise as exemplars of human greatness. Some prime examples include Goethe (TI, 
“Skirmishes,” 49), Leonardo da Vinci (BGE, 200), Raphael (TI, “Skirmishes,” 9), Beethoven 
(UM, III: 3), and of course Nietzsche himself (EH). (False modesty, as we shall see, is not a 
virtue of great individuals.) Although Nietzsche’s salient examples are creative and intellec-
tual  figures,  he mentions some political  figures as  well,  for  example Cesare Borgia  (TI, 3
“Skirmishes,” 37), Julius Caesar (BGE, 200), Napoleon (GM, I:16), and Frederick II (BGE, 
200). When Nietzsche describes or celebrates people as great, it is often unclear whether he 
means that they are great of soul, or simply (or perhaps in addition) people who are great in 
virtue of having momentous influence, in, for example, putting their stamp decisively on his-
tory. My focus in this paper is primarily on greatness of soul, rather than this other sort of 
greatness, if we want to call it that (which might include Nietzsche’s arch-villain St. Paul).  4
Given how the two can come apart, it remains an open question whether even all of these 
individuals listed are great of soul. Clearly Goethe makes the cut, probably Beethoven, but 
 This point is stressed in Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 3
Press, 1985), 227, and in Brian Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality (2nd ed.) (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 
98. 
 The German adjective groß, and to some extent the English “great,” can, we must remember, merely charac4 -
terize something as of considerable size or extent (the Great Famine, the Great Fire of London); it needn’t 
indicate a positive normative assessment. Those with momentous influence are clearly “great” in the former 
sense in the influence they have. Whether they are in the latter sense is more contentious. 
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with some of the others it is less clear. Socrates and St. Paul exert a tremendous influence, 
but they are, in Nietzsche’s (perhaps tendentious) eyes, not great of soul.  5
What are the psychical features of these sorts of individuals? Again, Nietzsche is 
never very systematic, but, across a range of passages, he makes various suggestions. But 
does this mean that there is a set of characteristics that they all have in common? This has 
been claimed in the recent secondary literature (albeit with a narrower range of features 
than those I give here) , but it seems to me that this move is too hasty. Though I will go on 6
to give some characteristics of greatness, it needn’t be the case that every Nietzschean great 
individual has every one of these features listed. When Nietzsche says that something is 
great,  or  “belongs  to  greatness,”  or  some such locution,  it  is  never  clear  from the  text 
whether the characteristics Nietzsche cites are suﬃcient and/or necessary for greatness, as 
opposed to generic characterizations or simply frequent marks of it. Moreover, it is not clear 
that there is meant to be a single ideal, as opposed to several. Nietzsche is a thinker highly 
sensitive  to historical  variability;  the virtues  conducive and constitutive of  excellence in 
Homeric Greece, are not, one-for-one, those in late modern societies.   Moreover,  if  we 7
come to Nietzsche expecting a deeper philosophical explanation or argument of why these 
particular features redound to greatness, we are, in my view, likely to be disappointed. Inter-
preters, to this end, will sometimes ascribe to the so-called “will to power” a special priority 
 TI, “The Problem of Socrates” is a vitriolic attack not just on Socrates’s philosophy, but on him personally as 5
decadent and sick. Paul, likewise, is characterized as animated by hatred (A, 42), a clear sign of the workings of 
poisonous ressentiment in his psychological economy. Whatever wide influence their doctrines have, these two 
people are not paragons of Nietzchean virtue. 
 Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality; Patrick Hassan, “Nietzsche on Human Greatness,” Journal of Value Inquiry 51:293–6
(2017) 310. 
 Simon Townsend,“Beyond the Myth of the Nietzschean Ideal Type,” European Journal of Philosophy 25, No. 3 7
(2017), 617-37. 
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and reconstruct Nietzsche’s ideas so as to seek to give it this unifying explanatory role.  I 8
myself am more skeptical about the exegetical and philosophical merits of this will-to-power 
centered approach, and thus do not adopt it here. Nietzsche, in my view, is not a systematic 
thinker who argues from a single master value, or from an essentialist conception of human 
nature, to a view about human excellence (or anything else). What he gives us instead is a 
vision, which we must piece together from snippets of text, of what sorts of people and 
traits are especially admirable. Whether that vision persuades, or resonates, will likely de-
pend on what values we hold, rather than on any argument Nietzsche gives for it. 
Work on this topic has sometimes been framed in response to Alexander Nehamas, 
who claimed in his 1985 book Nietzsche: Life as Literature that Nietzsche does not oﬀer any 
“descriptions of what an ideal person or an ideal life would be like.”  It has been pointed out 9
in reply that Nehamas’s contention is in fact incorrect; Nietzsche gives a number of descrip-
tive characterizations of such people and lives in his works. But nonetheless, I think there is 
an important grain of truth to Nehamas’s skepticism. Nietzsche’s descriptions of his ideal of 
greatness do not provide us with helpfully regulative necessary and suﬃcient conditions. This 
is because Nietzsche does not specify conditions for how to be great, in such a way that ob-
servers could look to these conditions and the person at issue and easily settle the question 
of whether someone is great. The conditions just cannot be specified in enough detail so 
that it becomes an easy question, brooking no debate, whether someone meets them. It will 
typically involve contentious interpretation.  10
 One philosophically-sophisticated such attempt is to be found in John Richardson, Nietzsche’s System (Oxford: 8
Oxford University Press, 1996). 
 Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature, 8. Those responding include Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality, 93 and Hassan, 9
“Nietzsche on Human Greatness,” 295. 
 Here Nehamas’s extended analogy of lives to artworks is a helpful one. See Nietzsche: Life as Literature. 10
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But issues of this sort aside, this examination of characteristics will nonetheless pro-
vide us with some important insight into Nietzsche’s views, even if it is not a kind of rigid 
rubric. To that end, I will list a number of these characteristic features, and make a few brief 
comments on them. Before we proceed, an initial caveat is in order regarding pronouns and 
gender. All of Nietzsche’s examples of great individuals are men, and most of his remarks 
concerning women are shockingly misogynistic. Regrettable though that may be, this makes 
the masculine pronoun the appropriate one in describing his view, and that is what I shall do 
in what follows. 
III. The Characteristics of Nietzschean Greatness and Greatness of Soul
Independent, to the point of being solitary. 
Describing the human beings who will appear in a more “virile, warlike” age, he says that 
they are those who are “silent, lonely, resolute, and content and constant in invisible activi-
ties” (GS, 283). The “concept of greatness entails… wanting to be by oneself, being able to be 
diﬀerent, standing alone and having to live independently” (BGE, 212). He is someone who 
is “always in his own company, whether he associates with books, human beings, or land-
scapes” (EH, “Wise,” 2). As with many things Nietzsche mentions, this characteristic is both 
a sign of greatness and an enabler of it. In living independently, one maintains distance from 
received opinions, and finds the peace and freedom from distraction to pursue significant 
projects. 
Focused in pursuit of a goal. 
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Great  individuals  are  single-minded in their  focus on these sorts  of  significant projects. 
These are the people who want to make a lasting stamp on the world, whether by writing 
novels, composing symphonies, or by building empires. Whereas others are pulled in various 
directions, or fritter away their time, great individuals stay on course. Nietzsche, describing 
himself  in this regard, says he is  “well  disposed toward moralities which goad me to do 
something and to do it again, from morning till evening, and then to dream of it at night, 
and to think of nothing except doing this well, as well as I alone can do it (GS, 304).
Self-disciplined. 
Great individuals exercise strict discipline on themselves, a sort of self-control (TI, “Skir-
mishes,” 49). They do not simply give free reign to their passing desires and impulses, but 
hold them in check sometimes. It might be nice to stay in the warm bed an extra hour in the 
morning, but this would squander productive time for work, so the great individual might 
force himself up for early writing, after dousing his face in icy cold water. Although Niet-
zsche abhors asceticism for asceticism’s sake, he is not against asceticism and renunciation 
when it is done in furtherance of a worthy goal. If you are dousing your face in cold water 
because this will invigorate you for the day, that is a very diﬀerent matter from doing it be-
cause you believe you, as a sinner, deserve no better (GM, III:9). Maintaining this discipline 
requires a certain “hammer-hardness” (BGE, 225) of being able to withstand suﬀering when 
necessary. “The discipline of suﬀering, of great suﬀering—do you not know that only this dis-
cipline has created all enhancements of man so far? (BGE, 225). (See also BGE, 188). 
Viewing others through the lens of one’s project
Huddleston    of  9 32
Because of this intense commitment, other people will be viewed primarily with regard to 
whether they are a help or a hindrance to what the great individual is seeking to accomplish. 
“A human being who strives for something great considers everyone he meets on his way ei-
ther as a means or a delay and obstacle—or as a temporary resting place” (BGE, 273).
Having a certain hardness against others
One must even have a certain degree of apparent callousness: “Who will attain anything 
great if he does not find in himself the strength and the will to inflict great suﬀering? Being 
able to suﬀer is the least thing; weak women and even slaves often achieve virtuosity in that. 
But not to perish of internal distress and uncertainty when one inflicts great suﬀering and 
hears the cry of this suﬀering—that is great, that belongs to greatness” (GS, 325). This is a 
chillingly disconcerting quotation, calling to mind, with the benefit of historical hindsight, 
hardened concentration camp guards. But it is important to note that less unsavory things 
(indeed morally heroic ones) could meet this condition too. An acquaintance of mine, who is 
a physician and experienced mountain climber, once did an appendectomy on someone in 
desperate need during a climb on K2. I’ve not heard the details of the story in full detail, but 
imagine, given the minimal anesthetics available,  that the operation must have been ex-
tremely painful, and no doubt provoked great cries from the suﬀering patient. To persist in 
the face of this takes great resolve, but it was what needed doing. 
Magnanimity 
Despite  this  hardness  against  others,  one  will  not  take  vengeance  against  them  for 
vengeance’s sake. Nietzsche describes the person of magnanimity (Großmuth) as one who has 
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the possibility of revenge, but “drain[s] it in his imagination,” rising above it and forgiving 
the enemy (GS, 49; Cf., GS, 340) (Nietzsche suggests that this is because he becomes nause-
ated at this vengeful state, perhaps as something beneath him.) Even more extreme is the 
case of Mirabeau and those like him, who are so far above the slights done to them that they 
simply brush them oﬀ and forget about them (GM, I:10).
Resilient in the face of diﬃculties
We inevitably face various diﬃculties. The great individual is someone able to cope with 
these as they come. He “guesses what remedies avail against what is harmful; he exploits bad 
accidents to his advantage; what does not kill him makes him stronger” (EH, “Wise,” 2; Cf., 
TI, “Maxims,” 8). After a setback or a defeat, some may slink away, or collapse into depres-
sion. But the great individual will treat this as an encouragement to go on—to, as it were, 
get back in the saddle and try again or to move on to something else significant. 
Seeking obstacles and challenges to be overcome
Indeed, it is not just that the great person waits for challenges and then copes with them 
when and as they come. He actively seeks out challenges, at least in certain domains. He is, as 
Nietzsche says, one who is “bent on seeking in all things for what in them must be overcome” 
(GS, 283). Such a person is not content to rest in comfort, but wants to try things that are 
new and diﬃcult. If he has climbed one impressively high mountain, he will want to climb a 
yet higher one, or forgo the supplemental oxygen. If he has solved one diﬃcult puzzle, he 
will want to try a more diﬃcult one. This aspect of the view is related to the idea of the will 
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to power, with the idea being that these challenges provide an opportunity to exercise the 
will to power.  One manifests one’s power in the overcoming of such challenges. 11
Willing to live dangerously
Because of this emphasis on continual striving and overcoming, Nietzsche puts a premium 
on living dangerously. “[T]he secret for harvesting from existence the greatest fruitfulness 
and the greatest enjoyment is—to live dangerously! Build your cities on the slopes of Vesu-
vius! Send your ships into uncharted seas! Live at war with your peers and yourselves!” (GS, 
283). Nietzsche of course means this beyond literal bodily peril. He also has in mind the idea 
of exposing oneself to the possibility of failure. It is in taking these sorts of risks that one 
makes possible many of the greatest sorts of accomplishments. In order to be willing to do 
this,  the  instinct  of  “self-preservation”  must  be  suspended  (TI,  “Skirmishes,”  44).  This 
needn’t mean that one is foolhardy or rashly self-destructive. But it does mean that one does 
not put safety and caution above all else. 
Instinctively drawn toward healthy courses of action
In some apparent tension with this idea of living dangerously and putting aside self-preser-
vation is the idea that the great person seeks out healthy courses of action. Nietzsche sug-
gests that such a person has a “taste only for what is good for him; his pleasure, his delight, 
cease where the measure of what is good for him is transgressed” (EH, “Wise” 2). How can 
 There are a variety of exegetical issues concerning the will to power, which I will need to leave to the side. 11
But at least one important aspect of the will to power is that it involves this seeking out and overcoming of 
obstacles and resistances. For further discussion, see Bernard Reginster, The Aﬃrmation of  Life:  Nietzsche on 
Overcoming  Nihilism  (Cambridge,  MA:  Harvard  University  Press,  2006)  and  Paul  Katsafanas,  “Nietzsche’s 
Philosophical Psychology,” in the Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche, ed. Ken Gemes and John Richardson (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013). Exactly how far to take this is another matter. 
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putting oneself in danger represent an instinctive choice towards the healthy? We need to 
remember  that  Nietzschean health,  in  its  highest  forms,  is  going  to  be  bound up with 
strength, resilience, and vitality. The fact that one can expose oneself to danger, and yet get 
through it without being undone and with having accomplished something important, is a 
sign of health. That fact that one would need, or feel the need, to cocoon oneself away from 
any potential threat is a sign not of health but of sickness. The fact that one should focus 
on, or feel the need to focus on, mere self-preservation is a sign of a weaker nature; for a 
stronger person, such considerations would be decidedly secondary. 
Verschwendung 
Also somewhat in tension with being instinctively drawn to the healthy is the idea of self 
“Verschwendung,” perhaps best rendered as “self-expending.” Nietzsche writes: “The genius, 
in  work  and  deed,  is  necessarily  an  expender:  that  he  expends  himself,  that  is  his 
greatness” (TI, “Skirmishes,” 44). Nietzsche draws comparisons here to pent-up explosives 
and to rivers flooding their banks. Thanks to this superabundant outpouring, at the limit the 
great individual may need to forgo even his own health and sacrifice himself in the service of 
his cause. But this is something Nietzsche sees as admirable and heroic in the “devotion to 
an idea, a great cause, a fatherland” that it displays (TI, “Skirmishes,” 44).  
Resistance to stimuli
The analogy to rivers flooding their banks and explosives can seem to deprive great individ-
uals of any sort of agency. It can make it seem as if they are just a bundle of dispositions that 
can be triggered in the right circumstances. But this underplays the fact that Nietzsche 
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thinks of them as characteristically able to step back and make a sensible decision about 
what to do: The great individual “reacts slowly to all kinds of stimuli, with that slowness 
which long caution and deliberate pride have bred in him: he examines the stimulus that ap-
proaches him…” (EH, “Wise,” 2). This is strongly connected with the sort of self-discipline 
mentioned above. Weaker individuals, by contrast, cannot resist such “stimuli.” They are far 
more reactive. This is not to say that the great have any kind of libertarian free will, but it is 
to  make  room for  a  kind  of  reflective  dimension  when it  comes  to  human action  and 
agency.   12
Honest in their outlook
The strength of spirit characteristic of great individuals is correlated with being able to bear 
reality unadulterated. “[S]trength of spirit,” Nietzsche writes, might be “measured according 
to how much of the ‘truth’ one could still barely endure—or to put it more clearly, to what 
degree  one  would  require  it  to  be  thinned  down,  shrouded,  sweetened,  blunted, 
falsified” (BGE, 39). For this reason, Nietzsche praises honesty [Redlichkeit] as an important 
virtue of free spirits (BGE, 227). “In the middle of an age with an unreal outlook, Goethe 
was a convinced realist” (TI, “Skirmishes,” 49). He didn’t need to live by the usual pieties 
and illusions. 
Life-aﬃrming
 Paul Katsafanas, The Nietzschean Self: Moral Pyschology, Agency, and the Unconscious (Oxford: Oxford University 12
Press, 2016) makes this conscious, reflective dimension very central to action and agency. Others are more fo-
cused on the unconscious drives and their interrelation. See Ken Gemes, “Nietzsche on Free Will, Autonomy, 
and the Sovereign Individual,” in Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy, ed. Ken Gemes and Simon May (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009) and John Richardson, “Nietzsche’s Freedoms,” in Nietzsche on Freedom and Au-
tonomy, ed. Ken Gemes and Simon May (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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Another key mark of the great individual is satisfaction with this life and world, rather than 
longing for another and allegedly better one. Such a person is one that Nietzsche will de-
scribe as life-aﬃrming. At the extreme, one will not just be positively disposed to this life and 
world, but will love it in every dimension. Nietzsche speaks of the “ideal of the most high-
spirited,  alive,  and  world-aﬃrming  human  being  who  has  not  only  come  to  terms  and 
learned to get along with whatever was and is, but who wants what was and is repeated into 
all eternity, shouting insatiably da capo—not only to himself but to the whole play and spec-
tacle” (BGE, 56).  Similarly,  Nietzsche writes,  with reference to Goethe, that he “stands 13
amid the cosmos with a joyous and trusting fatalism, in the faith that only the particular is 
loathsome, and that all is redeemed and aﬃrmed in the whole—he does not negate any more. 
Such a faith, however, is the highest of all possible faiths: I have baptized it with the name 
of Dionysus (TI, “Skirmishes,” 49). The Dionysian faith makes one favorably disposed to this 
life and world, even though it has some questionable and terrifying features. 
Cheerful/Joyful
In keeping with this basically aﬃrmative attitude, the great individual will be someone who 
is fundamentally cheerful or joyful (TI, “Skirmishes,” 49). There are of course people who 
are smilingly blithe in a self-satisfied way, and Nietzsche treats such people with scorn.  The 14
 Exactly what does it take to be life-aﬃrming? Does one need to aﬃrm absolutely everything? Or is it a more 13
modest ideal? Does it follow that Nietzsche regards all such things as worthy of aﬃrmation? I discuss matters 
further in Andrew Huddleston, “Aﬃrmation, Admirable Overvaluation, and the Eternal Recurrence,” in Niet-
zsche on Morality and Aﬃrmation, ed. Daniel Came (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
 Cf., Nietzsche’s subtle remarks on ‘cheerfulness’ in Schopenhauer as Educator, where he describes a “a cheerful14 -
ness that really cheers,” in contrast to more superficial varieties (UM, III:2). We see the same sort of distinc-
tion at work when Nietzsche scorns the contentment of the ‘last man’ (TSZ, “Prologue”), while nonetheless 
praising a more hard-won form of cheerfulness on the part of others. As Nietzsche puts it in UM III:2, de-
scribing the more genuine kind of “cheerfulness that really cheers,”  “at bottom there is  cheerfulness only 
where there is a victory.” 
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“last man” is an example of such a type (TSZ, “Prologue”). The great individual will be one 
who has faced diﬃculties, even faced great suﬀering, but still manages to be cheerful in the 
face of this.  His opposite is the resentful person who goes through life in a foul mood, 
spreading his misery to others.  According to Nietzsche, one of the most destructive fea15 -
tures of Judeo-Christian morality, and its emphasis on compassion for suﬀering, is that it 
undermines this sort of joy by bringing misery to the fore and making people think that 
they have no right to be happy when others are suﬀering such misfortune. If the consciences 
of the strong get “poison[ed” with the thought of this alleged injustice, they will become 
ashamed of their good fortune and begin to “doubt their right to happiness” (GM, III:14).
Self-reverential
In addition to holding life in high regard, great individuals hold themselves in high regard. 
“The noble  soul,”  Nietzsche writes,  “has  reverence  [Ehrfurcht]  for  itself”  (BGE, 287;  Cf.,  GS, 
284).This is not to say that anyone with self-reverence is thereby a noble soul. Lots of delud-
ed narcissists have a great deal of self-reverence. But the great individual is one who reveres 
himself and, importantly, whose characteristics merit this reverence. Such a person will not 
go in for false modesty, but certainly won’t go in for unnecessary degrees of self-deprecation 
either. Nor will he go in for moralities of “un-selfing” [Entselbstung] that see the self as some-
thing to be escaped. On the flipside of self-reverence, we have self-dissatisfaction. But it is 
entirely appropriate for many to be dissatisfied with themselves. Even the great should be 
dissatisfied with themselves in some circumstances, for example when they’ve not lived up 
 “There is among them an abundance of the vengeful disguised as judges, who constantly bear the word ‘jus15 -
tice’ in their mouths like poisonous spittle, always with pursed lips, always ready to spit upon all who are not 
discontented but go their way in good spirits” (GM III:14). 
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to an ideal. And for those working toward self-cultivation, dissatisfaction can be what pow-
ers one forward toward improvement.   If self-dissatisfaction becomes a persistent state, 16
though, it can have deforming eﬀects on one’s character: “Whoever is dissatisfied with him-
self is continually ready for revenge, and we others will be his victims, if only by having to 
endure his ugly sight. For the sight of what is ugly makes one bad and gloomy” (GS, 290). 
Aesthetically-appealing
As this mention of the threat of ugliness will suggest, Nietzsche puts considerable emphasis 
on aesthetic considerations. The great person is going to be aesthetically-appealing, not just 
in physical terms (though maybe in that way too), but in being the sort of person with an 
alluringly stylish character. Such a person, one “who has turned out well,” is one who is “carved 
from wood that is hard, delicate, and at the same time smells good” (EH, “Wise, 2). Niet-
zsche, likewise, speaks of the potential “splendor” [Pracht] of the type man, which morality 
may be impeding (GM, “Preface,” 6), further emphasizing this aesthetic dimension.  More-
over, Nietzsche compares lives to works of art, with the suggestion that impressive lives 
share certain features with works of art (GS, 290, GS, 299). While some of these aesthetic 
characteristics will be external, there is a close interrelation between these outward manifes-
tations and the qualities of one’s soul. One does not simply present a pleasant outward face; 
one has a kind of unity or integration among one’s drives, a condition that might usefully be 
 See UM, III:6, where Nietzsche describes how an “exemplar” can enable a “consecration to culture:” “the 16
sign of that consecration is that one is ashamed of oneself without any accompanying feeling of distress, that 
one comes to hate one's own narrowness and shriveled nature, that one has a feeling of sympathy for the genius 
who again and again drags himself up out of our dryness and apathy and the same feeling in anticipation for all 
those who are still  struggling and evolving,  with the profoundest conviction at almost everywhere we en-
counter nature pressing towards man and again and again failing to achieve him, yet everywhere succeeding in 
producing the most marvelous beginnings, individual traits and forms: so that the men we live among resemble 
a field over which is scattered the most precious fragments of sculpture where everything calls to us: come, 
assist, complete, bring together what belongs together, we have an immeasurable longing to become whole.” 
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thought of as aesthetic. The success (or failure) of this integration can be evident in one’s 
characteristics.  As  in  Nietzsche’s  example  above,  the  person  who  hates  himself  will  be 
marred by a kind of ugliness, if not in the literal visual sense, then in the kind of spiritual 
condition his persona evinces. 
Self-shaped 
Although some of this aesthetic appeal may be fortuitous, Nietzsche makes clear that it is 
something at which one has to work. It is a “great and rare art” to “‘give style’” to one’s 
“character” (GS, 290) in this way. This happens when one formulates an “artistic plan” for 
the self, and fits the various pieces together according to it, thereby creating a unified style. 
In this vein, Nietzsche talks about self-creation, an idea that can seem to court paradox. In 
what sense is a self being created, when this sort of artistic plan is being followed? This 
seems to raise a kind of regress problem. Who, after all, is doing the creating? The very self 
being created? I don’t propose to go into detail about Nietzsche’s views on the self and on 
freedom of the will, both being a minefield of diﬃculties.  At minimum, though, we can al17 -
low that one has scope for making certain aesthetic choices and thereby determining, to 
some extent, how one’s life goes, viewed through this aesthetic lens. This is all that is re-
quired for a less ambitious kind of aesthetic self-creation. To say that one exerts an influ-
ence in this way is not to presuppose libertarian free will or a blank canvas that can be filled 
in entirely as one wishes. (On these issues, see GS, 335; BGE, 225; TI, “Skirmishes,” 49).
 A good overview of the debate, and proposal for a middle ground position, can be found in R. Lanier Ander17 -
son, “What is a Nietzschean Self,” in Nietzsche, Naturalism, and Normativity, ed. Christopher Janaway and Simon 
Robertson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). See also Sebastian Gardner, “Nietzsche, the Self, and the 
Disunity of Philosophical Reason,” in Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy, ed. Ken Gemes and Simon May (Ox-
ford) and Alexander Nehamas, “Nietzsche, Intention, Action,” European Journal of Philosophy 26, no. 2 (2018): 
685-701.
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Integrated in their manifold drives and impulses (BGE 212, GS, 290; TI, “Skirmishes,” 49)
Nietzsche’s aesthetics is classical in spirit, in the emphasis it puts on integration above all 
else.  This unity is not merely at the surface, but cuts much more deeply in the organization 18
of one’s underlying drives. Given the sort of creatures we are, we have a range of drives 
pulling in diﬀerent directions. But in the great individual, these will be hierarchically orga-
nized, so that there is an (appropriate) dominant drive ruling over the other drives and turn-
ing them toward its purpose. This brings about a kind of wholeness, such that greatness of 
man is to be found in his “range and multiplicity, in his wholeness in manifoldness” (BGE, 
212).  19
Possessed of an “instinct” for “cleanliness”
Finally, one of the most distinctive characteristics Nietzsche mentions is an “instinct” for 
“cleanliness” (BGE, 271). There is something almost boy-scout-sounding about this charac-
teristic if we take it literally. But Nietzsche mainly means it in a more metaphorical register, 
resonating with several of the characteristics we have already discussed. In epistemic terms, 
cleanliness is a matter of intellectual honesty, particularly with one’s self. It is, in aesthetic 
terms, a matter of the characteristic reaction that the great person has to those who are ill-
constituted. Nietzsche writes of himself that his “instinct for cleanliness is characterized by 
a perfectly uncanny sensitivity so that the proximity or—what I am saying—the inmost 
 For further discussion of Nietzsche’s commitment to unity, see Ken Gemes, “Nietzsche’s Use and Abuse of 18
Postmodernism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62, no. 2, (2001): 337-60.
 Richardson, Nietzsche’s System; Ken Gemes, “Nietzsche and Freud on Sublimation,” Journal of Nietzsche Studies 19
38, no. I, 38-59 (2009); Christopher Janaway, “Nietzsche on Morality, Drives, and Human Greatness,” in Niet-
zsche, Naturalism, and Normativity, ed. Christopher Janaway and Simon Robertson (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012). 
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parts, the “entrails” of every soul are physiologically perceived by me—smelled” (EH, “Why I 
Am So Wise,” 8). He is thus able to find the “abundant hidden dirt at the bottom of many a 
character” (EH, “Why I Am So Wise,” 8) and to stay away when necessary. 
IV. Relation to Aristotle
In his seminal 1950 book Nietzsche:  Philosopher,  Psychologist,  Antichrist,  Walter Kauf-
mann made the influential suggestion that Nietzsche’s great-souled person is importantly 
similar to the Aristotelian megalopsychos.  Kaufmann wrote this study in the wake of the 20
Second World War, at a time when Nietzsche’s reputation was in tatters. He sought to reha-
bilitate Nietzsche by showing that his philosophy was continuous with a tradition of hu-
manism, and not the proto-Nazi celebration of ruthless power that it was often taken to be 
at the time. It is as part of this endeavor of rehabilitation that Kaufmann tries to show the 
aﬃnities between Nietzsche and Aristotle.  Though Kaufmann’s intentions were noble, and 21
his readings often astute, he had a tendency to overplay his hand. Many studies over the half 
past century have reacted to aspects of Kaufmann’s reading, showing the way he presents an 
overly rosy picture of Nietzsche. On the topic of the great-souled person in particular, both 
Aristotle  scholars  and Nietzsche scholars  have resisted Kaufmann’s  comparison between 
Aristotle and Nietzsche as unilluminating and superficial.  But, to my mind, Kaufmann’s 22
 Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950 20
[1974]), 82-3. Cf., the useful discussion of this issue in Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality, 97. 
 The megalopsychos may himself seem slightly suspect from a modern moral perspective. But Kaufmann, in 21
framing this comparison, is trying to show that the Nietzschean great-souled person is not really all that bad. 
 From the perspective of Aristotle scholarship, see Daniel Russell, “Aristotle’s Virtues of Greatness,” in Oxford 22
Studies  in Ancient  Philosophy Supplementary Volume,  ed. Rachana Kamtekar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012). From the perspective of Nietzsche scholarship, see Bernd Magnus, “Aristotle and Nietzsche: ‘Megalopsy-
chia’ and ‘Übermensch” in The Greeks and the Good Life, ed. David J. Depew (Fullerton: California State Fullerton 
Press, 1980). 
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suggestion has more going for it. There are certainly notable divergences between Aristotle 
and Nietzsche. But scholars have been too quick to dismiss the parallel, and have done so 
based on a misunderstanding and mischaracterization of Nietzsche’s views on reason and 
rationality. I will begin by drawing out some of the key points of parallel and then will then 
proceed to answer the skeptical objections that have been leveled. 
Before we get to the level of specific characteristics, the first thing to note is the sim-
ilarly high position that this figure of the “great-souled” person occupies in the esteem of 
Aristotle and Nietzsche respectively. For Aristotle and for Nietzsche, it is a person who is 
flourishing and is doing so to an exceptional degree. Aristotle will describe this greatness of 
soul as a “crowning” virtue, or, as it is also translated, an “adornment” of the virtues (NE, 
1124a). For both Nietzsche and Aristotle, this is a rare condition. It is not a virtue that is in 
everyone’s reach.  But matters go considerably beyond this to include some of the more 23
specific characteristics of the people in question. Consider some of the central features of 
the Aristotelian megalopsychos, as discussed in Book IV of the Nicomachean Ethics: 
High (justified) self-regard. 
This is a person who holds himself in high esteem, thinking himself “worthy of great things” 
(NE, 1123b). But, importantly, such a person is warranted in doing so. “What he thinks he is 
worthy of accords with his real worth” (NE, 1123b). Others (the vain, the humble) think too 
 Nietzsche believes (perhaps unfairly) that Christianity praises virtues suited to the lowest common denomi23 -
nator, such as meekness and humility, which are virtues even the basest person can have. This, as I say, is 
somewhat unfair, since certain Christian virtues are extremely (maybe impossibly) demanding. An important 
theme in certain strands of Christian moral psychology is that it is extremely diﬃcult to be truly humble. One’s 
vanity will creep in and one will do things for the wrong reasons. Similarly demanding are the exhortations to 
love one’s neighbor as oneself and to turn the other cheek when wronged. 
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much or too little of themselves, where this is not justified by their capacities and accom-
plishments. 
Less regard for (most) others. 
Coupled with this high self-regard, the megalopsychos will also not think much of most other 
people.  But his belief, according to Aristotle, is accurate. “For the magnanimous person is 24
justified when he thinks less of others, since his beliefs are true” (NE, 1124b). He won’t be 
flaunting this distance in an arrogant way (NE, 1124b), but one will have a self-assured sense 
that he is above others, and will not be ashamed about this, nor afraid to assert it in the 
right circumstances. 
Concern with significant tasks
This is a person, Aristotle tells us, who will do a few well-chosen significant actions, not a 
number of insignificant small  ones.  “His actions are few, but great and renowned” (NE, 
1124b).
Magnanimity (in the narrow sense)
“He is not prone…to remember evils, since it is proper to a magnanimous person not to 
nurse memories, especially not of evils, but to overlook them” (NE, 1125a).
 Cf. Nietzsche on this sense of being above others:  “Without that pathos of distance which grows out of the 24
ingrained diﬀerence between strata—when the ruling caste constantly looks afar and looks down upon subjects 
and instruments and just as constantly practices obedience and command, keeping down and keeping at a dis-
tance—that other,  more mysterious pathos could not have grown up either—the craving for an ever new 
widening of  distances within the soul  itself,  the development of  ever  higher,  rarer,  more remote,  further-
stretching, more comprehensive states—in brief,  simply the enhancement of the type ‘man,’  the continual 
‘self-overcoming of man’ (BGE, 257). 
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Independence
He is independent of the opinions of (most) others. “He cannot let anyone else, except a 
friend, determine his life. For that would be slavish; and this is why all flatterers are servile 
and [why] inferior people are flatterers” (NE, 1125a). He “stays away from what is commonly 
honored” (NE, 1124b). As Nietzsche might have put it, he is above herdish opinions, or hon-
ors conferred by the herd. 
Courage
He “faces dangers in a great cause, and whenever he faces them he is unsparing of his life, 
since he does not think life at all costs worth living” (NE, 1124b).  
Honesty
He is concerned for truth more than for people’s opinions. He is also honest with himself 
and honest with others, for example, “open in his hatreds…since concealment is proper to a 
frightened person” (NE, 1124b). 
We thus see a number of notable similarities between the Nietzschean great-souled 
individual and the Aristotelian megalopsychos. So why then is the Nietzschean great-souled 
individual thought to be so markedly diﬀerent? The main line of objection focuses on the 
role of reason in Aristotle’s conception of the virtuous life. For Aristotle, rational activity is 
the good of man, and he similarly puts a considerable emphasis on rationality, as manifested 
in prudence/ practical wisdom (phronesis). But Nietzsche, the objection continues, is dubious 
about the value of reason and rationality. While there is some truth in this, the point, I be-
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lieve, has been overstated, and makes the divergences between Aristotle and Nietzsche ap-
pear greater than they in fact are. The charge of “irrationalism” is one often put against Ni-
etzsche. But it is a caricature of his nuanced view. It plays into the idea that Nietzsche’s hu-
man ideal is that of a kind of borderline wild-animal, the pillaging noble described in the 
First  Essay of the Genealogy.  But Nietzsche recognizes that we are far more interesting, 
complex, spiritual creatures at this juncture in history. Nietzsche is not against practical 
wisdom and  rationality  as  such.  He is  against  an  i)  overestimation  of  their  significance; 
against ii) misunderstandings of what they amount to; and against the iii) perverse shapes 
they can sometimes take. 
One reason for holding that Nietzsche is an anti-rationalist is that he emphasizes the 
role of the unconscious. Some might accordingly be drawn toward the interpretation that he 
thinks conscious ratiocination is just a screen for processes going on at an unconscious level. 
This will sometimes be expressed in terms of a drive psychology: We think we are reaching a 
rational decision, but really our drives are doing all the work. There is considerable debate 
about what exactly Nietzsche’s view on these issues is, and it is well-beyond the scope to ad-
judicate it here.  But this, at least, needs to be accounted for: we are beings who think 25
about what we do, and seem to have reasons for the courses of action we take, and engage in 
 For diﬀerent perspectives on this issue, see Richardson, Nietzsche’s System; Gemes, “Nietzsche on Free Will, 25
Autonomy, and the Sovereign Individual”; Gemes, “Nietzsche and Freud on Sublimation”; Tom Stern, ““Against 
Nietzsche’s ‘Theory’ of the Drives,” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1, no. 1, 121-40; Paul Kat-
safanas, The Nietzschean Self. Nietzsche no doubt wants to stress the basic continuity between other animals and 
humans, and to reign in the pretensions of humans to think that they are somehow special. He also wants to 
dethrone the conscious ego as supreme master in the human psyche. All of these are welcome philosophical 
insights. But the idea that we can adequately explain complex human behavior in reductive psycho-biological 
terms, if this was indeed Nietzsche’s theoretical view (and is indeed the view being attributed to him by some 
interpreters), seems to me crude and misguided—not to mention at odds with the rich psychological explana-
tions that Nietzsche actually gives. Here the agent’s own conceptualization of what they are doing, and the 
contextualization of that understanding in a social, historical, and cultural context, is going to be an important 
part of the explanatory story. That is not an argument I will make here, however. 
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intelligible and intelligent patterns of action. Often (as Nietzsche pointedly stresses) people 
are self-deceived about their reasons for action, or engaged in various post-hoc rationaliza-
tions. But in those honest with themselves, as the great-souled individual will be, this should 
be at a minimum. Rationality needn’t be understood as an autonomous eﬃcacious force or a 
mysterious transcendental capacity, nor need it be operative only at the conscious level. It is 
what enables us to act in intelligent and intelligible ways as human beings. Nietzsche is not 
denying the self-evident truth that it possible and desirable to be rational in this sense. His 
points are always more subtle. Consider this passage, sometimes wrongly cited as evidence 
for Nietzsche’s opposition to prudence:  26
…If a man is praised today for living “wisely” [weise] or “as a philosopher,” it hardly means 
more than “prudently [klug] and apart.” Wisdom seems to the rabble a kind of escape, a 
means and trick for getting well out of a wicked [schlimme] game. But the genuine philoso-
pher—as it seems to us, my friends?—lives “unphilosophically” and “unwisely,” above all im-
prudently [unklug] and feels the burden and the duty of a hundred attempts and temptations 
of life-he risks himself constantly, he plays the wicked game (BGE, 205). 
If we cherry-pick a phrase out of context, Nietzsche does seem to praise imprudence here. 
But this passage needs to be scrutinized carefully, rich as it is in inverted commas and word-
play. Nietzsche takes one conception of the philosophical life and, to it, juxtaposes another. 
One, he suggests, is borne of a desire for escape and an overabundance of caution. (He has 
perhaps in mind the Epicurean’s retreat to cultivate his garden.) He wants, by contrast, a 
 See Daniel Russell, “Aristotle’s Virtues of Greatness,” 134-5. 26
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philosopher who is an experimenter, willing to take risks. This makes him “‘unwise’” and 
“imprudent,” relative to one cautious standard of wisdom and prudence. But it does not mean 
that the Nietzschean philosopher doesn’t have a diﬀerent sort of wisdom and prudence of 
his own. Nietzsche is a person, after all, who entitles major sections of his autobiography 
Ecce Homo “Why I Am So Wise [weise]” and “Why I am So Prudent/Clever [klug].”
Further apparent evidence for Nietzsche’s alleged opposition to rationalism comes 
from his  criticism of  Socrates,  in  Nietzsche’s  words,  a  “buﬀoon”  who  makes  reason  a 
“tyrant” and who counsels that we be “absurdly rational” (TI, “The Problem of Socrates”). 
What Nietzsche would seem to have as his target in these remarks is not rationality per se, 
but an extreme version of it. It is sort that seeks, in the relentless way that Socrates does, to 
justify dialectically (often with quite specious arguments)  virtually everything that he be-
lieves and holds dear. Nietzsche sees this as perverse and futile (TI, “Socrates,” 5). But Niet-
zsche is not advocating that one behave irrationally, ignoring all considerations in favor of 
doing or believing things, nor is he suggesting abandoning oneself wholly to blind impulse. 
He challenges a perverse idea of what rationalism would be, not the idea that rationality 
[Vernunft] has an important role to play. Rationality (or Reason) [Vernunft] is, after all, some-
thing Nietzsche includes with  “virtue, art, music, dance…[and] spirituality” as among the 
things “for whose sake it is worth while to live on earth” (BGE, 188). 
Of course, there are major diﬀerences between Nietzsche and Aristotle. For the lat-
ter, rationality occupies an especially prominent role. The ergon (function) of the human be-
ing just is rational activity in accordance with virtue (NE, 1097b–1098a), and Aristotle sees 
human flourishing as realized through fulfilling this ergon. Nietzsche will part ways at this 
point, not, however, because he is an irrationalist, but instead because he thinks human na-
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ture and the human good is less closely tied to rationality and rational activity per se. This is 
compatible with thinking, as Nietzsche evidently does, that reason and rationality still have 
a central place in the well-ordered soul, in conjunction with other traits and virtues. The dis-
tance between Nietzsche and Aristotle on this front, while significant, has nonetheless been 
exaggerated, based on a misreading of Nietzsche. 
But there is still another salient diﬀerence, and I want to close by discussing that. On 
Nietzsche’s view, the great individual could, it would seem, be a profoundly immoral person, 
whereas this is not true of Aristotle, for whom being magnanimous requires also being “fine 
and good” (NE, 1124a). Greatness of soul and morality are yoked closely together in Aristo-
tle; in Nietzsche, they can come apart. 
Of course, some of the traits that Nietzsche celebrates haven’t always been as moral-
ly suspect as they are in the Judeo-Christian tradition, and some of the things he attacks 
haven’t always been as celebrated. Pride has not always been a vice, nor has humility always 
been a virtue, as reflection on Aristotle shows.  But could a deeply immoral person be great, 27
in  Nietzsche’s  eyes?  I  think Nietzsche’s  answer  is  pretty  clearly  yes.  Cesare  Borgia  and 
Napoleon left many dead in their self-aggrandizing wake. And yet, far from debarring them 
from being great, one suspects that this is not, for Nietzsche, an obstacle; if anything, some 
of their nastier traits advance their claim to Nietzschean greatness.  A more subtle question 28
is whether they can be great of soul, not just in influence or eﬀect. Although Nietzsche does 
 Cf. Howard Curzer, “Aristotle’s Much-Maligned Megalopyschos,” Australasian Journal of  Philosophy  69, no. 2 27
(1991): 131-51 for a diﬀerent perspective on the relation between this Aristotelian virtue and Christianity, 148-9. 
 For a good discussion of these issues, see Nehamas, “Nietzsche and ‘Hitler,’” Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 28
Supplement (1999): 1-17.
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not give us clear textual indication one way or the other, one suspects his answer would still 
be yes. He certainly does not include a morality constraint.
Even so, it is vital to see that it is not the mere fact that they perpetrate immoral 
deeds that speaks to their greatness. One of the ways in which Nietzsche is most often mis-
understood, by adolescents and the adolescently-minded, is that you become great or oth-
erwise prove yourself great just by doing something (maybe anything) deeply immoral and 
thereby demonstrating that you are above the sort of morality that constrains everyone else. 
This, it might be thought, is roughly the Leopold and Loeb understanding of Nietzsche. But 
simply murdering someone for sport, or proving yourself able to do so, is not suﬃcient for 
being great (particularly of soul). Nonetheless, it would appear that there are morally objec-
tionable people that Nietzsche would regard as great, and not just coincidentally great, but 
great partly thanks to some of their features that are morally suspect. Whatever qualms we 
might have about this view, it pretty clearly is Nietzsche’s. If one is to view and use others in 
instrumentalizing ways, or to regard their suﬀering with callousness, to be devoted in a sin-
gle-minded way to a personal project when one could be focused on the common weal, or to 
aﬃrm all of existence (including the questionable and terrible aspects),  morality (as con-
ceived by the Judeo-Christian tradition and its secular expressions), must not be one’s over-
riding focus of concern.
The question I want to close on is a diﬀerent one, namely this: Granted, some great 
people are immoral. But need a great person be particularly immoral—that is, more immoral 
than the average person? If so, why?  There are people who accomplish great things (more 
likely in art than in statecraft), without being ruthless or immoral about it, and often thanks 
to moral traits Nietzsche despises (a sense for the universal brotherhood of all humans, say). 
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Why then, it might be supposed, is there any necessary sort of tension between morality and 
greatness? But this line of objection focuses just on great accomplishment. Nietzsche can 
allow that there are great accomplishments, even by those who are not themselves great in-
dividuals, or great of soul. Such individual greatness is valuable not simply a route to inde-
pendent great accomplishments (e.g., writing the Eroica, defeating the Gauls). It is valuable 
for its own sake as well. The virtues and traits that Nietzsche cites are constitutive elements in 
the flourishing life. The person who lacks these sorts of traits (or has ones opposed to these) is 
leading a defective (or at least a non-ideal) life, in Nietzschean terms.The tension with the 
morality tradition is thus even more thoroughgoing than it might at first seem. Nietzsche is 
not just making an empirical claim about which traits which lead to the sorts of great things 
that Nietzsche values. His view of greatness and of greatness of soul is itself a conception of 
what an exceptionally good life amounts to. Judeo-Christianity holds out a certain ideal of 
great lives (e.g., the Christian saint, full of pity for the suﬀering mass of humanity), to which 
Nietzsche opposes a counter-ideal. In parts, it is very diﬃcult to accept. We may well reject 
that ideal, or at least not want to subscribe to it fully. But Nietzsche does force us to think 
more critically about what we think makes for a great-souled person, and challenges us with 
a provocative vision of his own. 
But for all his apparent radicalism, when it comes to greatness of soul, Nietzsche is 
less starting from scratch with an entirely new theory, but is in large part borrowing aspects 
of a classical tradition that he sees Judeo-Christianity as in danger of obscuring. That said, 
Nietzsche is a highly historical thinker. He doesn’t simply want us to return to a Homeric 
outlook, or to an Aristotelian outlook, or anything of the kind. But he thinks we can take 
important lessons for how we might move forward in the modern era, and think about the 
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shape a “great soul” might take in these changed conditions. That is among the tasks he sets 
himself  in  Beyond  Good  and  Evil,  and  his  other  towering  contributions  to  philosophical 
ethics.   29
 My gratitude to Ken Gemes, Alexander Nehamas, David Carr, and Sophia Vasalou for comments on the 29
ideas I discuss here, as well as to an audience at the “Virtues of Magnanimity” Conference at the University of 
Birmingham and to two anonymous referees. 
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